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State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) across the world are the main drivers of the economy; 
specifically through their contribution to their countries’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Although SOEs are the principal drivers of the formal sector of the economy and contribute 
significantly to the economic growth as the main entities that deliver many social goods 
and services to ensure the quality of life to all, they encounter governance failures, which 
need attention. Consequently, they become unsustainable and vulnerable to corruption. 
This article used a cross-analysis informed by a qualitative design to examine the 
governance of SOEs in the BRICS countries comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa. The article found that BRICS countries have no common agenda for SOEs, 
largely due to inadequate governance, ownership policy, oversight, and accountability 
disparities. Therefore, there is a need to reform the governance of the SOEs in each BRICS 
country to ensure that they become optimally responsive. The purpose of this article is to 
attempt to rekindle the discourse related to SOE governance in BRICS countries. 
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Introduction 
 
State-owned entities or enterprises (SOEs) are generally described as “any corporate entity 
recognized by national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership” 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2015). These 
enterprises account for approximately 5% of the total economy of an average OECD 
country, and 10%–40% of the largest emerging economies. Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, 
and Xu (2015) report that SOEs represent approximately 10% of the global Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  
There are many SOEs in the public utilities, telecommunications, banking, hydrocarbons, 
and extractive sectors. However, the number of SOEs decreased in virtually all 
industrialised and emerging economies after the economic crisis in 2008 (Som, 2013). This 
2008 global financial crisis damaged the image of the private sector—a substantial 
contributor to economic development—and also affected SOEs (Corrigan, 2014). Twelve 
years later, after the SOEs had been recovering, the COVID-19 pandemic emerged, 
wreaking havoc in the global market. South Africa, for example, was beset by governance 
challenges due to the corruption that emanated from the public procurement of COVID-
19 personal protective equipment (PPE). Silvestre, Gomes, and Gomes (2018) argue that 
an analysis of SOE governance is needed, and that there have been only a few studies on 
BRICS SOEs in this regard.  
Despite the 2008 global financial crisis and COVID-19 challenges that have other countries 
to rethink the role of SOEs due to market shifts, it has become apparent that for both 
political and economic reasons, the state will remain a major owner of various productive 
assets in a number of economies for years to come. In addition, the temporary government 
control of private sector enterprises has added to the existing corporate governance 
challenges. Governments are now concerned about maintaining a levelled playing field, 
and ensuring efficiency in the use of public money. Therefore, a corporate governance 
regime is important to improve efficiency in SOEs and to ensure that taxpayers’ money is 
well spent (Som, 2013). SOEs that are less driven by profits and more by political and social 
imperatives might be substantial economic drivers to stay the course. There is a need for 
a stable balancing act in this regard, namely, balancing the economic and socio-political 
interests in SOEs through proper governance arrangements. 
As SOEs are the providers of key public services, including public utilities, their governance 
structures and operations have an impact on citizens’ lives (OECD, 2015). However, the 
influence of politicians, rather than career business people in SOEs, could lead to 
favouritism and conflicts of interest (Corrigan, 2014, p. 2; Silvestre et al., 2018).  
Huifang (2016) argues that BRICS countries have come together as an economic bloc, and 
that this not only reflects the economic cooperation and political alliances of these 





   African Journal of Governance and Development | Volume 10 Issue 1 • July • 2021 201 
satisfying the real needs of these countries (Atale, 2012; Beeson & Zeng, 2018). This article 
considers the state of governance in SOEs in BRICS countries, and therefore, raises critical 
issues for consideration. Thus, the main question it raises is, “What is the state of 
governance in the SOEs of BRICS countries?” The article adopted a qualitative cross-analysis 
approach drawn from observations and document reviews to answer the research 
question. This is informed by the qualitative design.  
The authors found that despite these enterprises being the principal drivers of the formal 
sector of the economy, contributing significantly to the economic growth as the main 
entities that deliver many social goods and services that ensure the quality of life of the 
public, they encounter governance failures. Eventually, they become unsustainable and 
vulnerable to corruption, and more importantly, the abuse of public office for personal 
gain (Kyunga, Young-Hee, & Yang, 2018; Silvestre et al. 2018).  
The article considers the relevant conceptual and theoretical expositions on governance 
and public financial management. This is followed by an analysis of the SOE governance 
within the BRICS countries. For this reason, each BRICS country is objectively discussed 
regarding issues for consideration about the state of its SOE governance. Kanyane and 
Sausi (2015) argue that there is no single exceptional measure of corporate governance. 
This article attempts to contribute towards the resuscitation of the BRICS SOE governance 
discourse to poignantly strengthen governance in the BRICS SOEs to ensure their resilience 
against corruption or ethical questions. 
Conceptual and theoretical expositions 
 
The following sections provide conceptual and theoretical perspectives that underpin the 
BRICS SOE governance discourse.  
Governance 
Kanyane and Sausi (2015) describe governance as the structure and process through which 
institutions at every level determine the role players in decision-making and 
implementation processes, as well as determining those who are to be held accountable 
and responsible for the outcomes of the implemented decisions. Similarly, Sambo and 
Kanyane (2020) attest that, together with ethics, accountability forms an important pillar 
of governance. Subramanian (2015) posits that the government, as a shareholder in SOEs, 
should be a role model when it comes to corporate governance practices. However, the 
opposite is true, as SOEs have not demonstrated good corporate governance practices.  
According to Subramanian (2015), there are several reasons for the poor corporate 
governance in SOEs, some of which relate to serving public interests, while some relate to 
serving political objectives (Chakrabarti, 2017). In addition, the government plays 
conflicting roles as both a shareholder and a regulator of SOEs. Furthermore, when 
governments hold the majority stake in SOEs, the SOEs may experience less pressure from 
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finance (soft budget constraints). Therefore, SOEs may not have an incentive to improve 
their corporate governance practices to increase their value. 
Good governance includes having partnerships and networks between government 
agencies and civil society organisations (Kyunga et al., 2018). In SOEs, good corporate 
governance requires honesty, transparency, ethics, and integrity of all stakeholders 
involved in the running of these enterprises, namely, the shareholders, boards, executives 
and employees (Kanyane & Sausi, 2015).  
Corrigan (2014) avers that SOEs can be regarded as potentially powerful tools that 
governments can use for development purposes; thus, the way in which they operate has 
a substantial influence on a country’s wider business and corporate governance landscape. 
Corrigan (2014) further contends that even though SOEs embody ‘public interest’ by virtue 
of being funded by public resources, they are still ordinary companies, similar to others. 
However, due to their quasi-monopoly status they have great influence which makes them 
lucrative sources of patronage. In countries emerging from systems of large government 
intervention, regulation, or influence over markets, SOEs are likely to be the largest 
domestic companies in operation, often running and managing countries’ infrastructure. 
For this reason, it becomes even more critical for SOEs to subscribe to a corporate 
governance regime to ensure their long-term success, because they are more prone to 
failure due to non-compliance with legislation, in contrast with their counterparts in the 
private sector.  
An ‘agency problem’ in the governance of SOEs is due to the SOEs being controlled by 
professional managers, but owned by outside shareholders (Chakrabarti, 2017; 
Subramanian, 2015). Similarly, Som (2013, p.2) states that the specific challenges faced by 
SOEs in terms of governance include the “principal-agent problem, lack of proper 
oversight, political interference, weak and disorganized boards, and a confused mix of 
commercial and social objectives that SOEs must achieve”. As a result, corporate 
governance in SOEs is the main challenge in most countries. 
Public financial management 
By virtue of being majority owned or wholly owned by the state, SOEs must subscribe to 
the legislative and regulatory frameworks governing the management of public finances of 
their countries. Sambo (2017) argues that the aim of financial management is to improve 
the management, allocation, and control of financial resources. The above-mentioned 
author further argues that public finance is the basis of any government, because a 
government provides services to its citizens through public financial resources. Tkachenko 
(2020) maintains that although there are many definitions of public financial management, 
there is increased recognition that public financial management does not only cover 
technical accounting issues but the overall taxation, costs, and debt management of 
government, which affects the allocation of public financial resources as well as the 
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Tkachenko (2020) further states that the system of public finance management is a system 
of multiple role players, complex relationships, and dynamic and interrelated processes. 
Effective public financial management systems are therefore needed for the purposes of 
“maximizing the efficient use of resources, [creating] the highest level of transparency and 
accountability in government finances and [ensuring] long-term economic success” 
(Tkachenko, 2020, p. 78). Sambo (2017) supports the assertion by reiterating the 
importance of public financial management by government institutions, which should 
ensure that income and expenses are managed efficiently and effectively through their 
budget.  
Closely linked to these assertions is the notion of accountability, particularly financial 
accountability. Raffer (2004) refers to two types of financial accountability: external and 
internal accountability. The former refers to the obligation that institutions have to 
external stakeholders, such as customers and state agencies, while the latter refers to the 
obligations that internal stakeholders, such as staff, have toward each other. It is thus 
critical for all stakeholders in SOEs to be accountable, both in general, and from a financial 
perspective. 
This discussion needs to consider the important issue of soft and hard budget constraints. 
Maskin and Xu (2001) aver that soft budget constraints are caused by, among others, the 
ability of state institutions to negotiate their budgets ex post facto. The above authors 
further describe soft budget constraints in the context of politics, wherein a government 
bails out firms when, for various reasons, the political price of permitting the bankruptcy 
of such firms is considered too high, for example, affecting employment or enterprises fail 
due to a potential social unrest.  
Thus, Maskin and Xu (2001) argue that soft budget constraints have a direct influence on 
the efficiency of state institutions through the effect they have on the expectations of 
managers in those institutions. In this regard, managers are said to anticipate that the 
government would avoid massive insolvency by providing financial relief or bailouts to 
insolvent SOEs (Chakrabarti, 2017). SOEs that are constantly bailed out by the government 
would thus suffer from dependency syndrome and inefficiency, which are indicative of 
weak governance. Davis and Keiding (2002) argue that the consequences of profit losses 
and hard budget constraints could cause SOEs’ business closures due to weak governance 
arrangements. 
 
BRICS Governance Architecture 
The governance architecture of the BRICS countries is displayed in Table 1. The architecture 
comprises legal instruments and institutional mechanisms that reflect the extent to which 
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Table 1 BRICS governance architecture 
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Source: Authors own compilation 
As shown in the table, there is no direct legislation that governs SOEs in BRICS, neither is 
there legislation nor guidelines at BRICS level. SOEs are rather addressed in terms of the 
respective protocols and legislation in individual BRICS countries. For example, the 
appointment of SOE directors is covered by Law 13303/2016 in Brazil. In India, China, and 
South Africa, SOEs are legislated by various company acts and related protocols. The China 
Company Act of 1994 is the oldest, followed by that of South Africa that was passed in 
2008. The SOE boards of directors in the aforementioned three countries are regulated by 
guidelines and code of corporate governance, and are also under the control of various 
institutional mechanisms. These three countries have a fair governance framework, 
despite the challenges that are expounded on in the next discussion of each BRICS country. 
It is for this reason that there is diversified governance of SOEs in BRICS countries, as the 
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From Table 1, it can see seen that all BRICS countries have a Board of Directors (BODs). 
Brazilian SOEs, for example, are under the watch of the president of the country as the 
final arbiter to appoint and remove board directors. In Brazil, one wonders why the 
president has centralised the oversight of SOEs by being involved in appointing and firing 
any person in the position of power. This centralised arrangement is compounded by many 
governance challenges and could be potentially abused by the political leaders. No 
wonder, Thomas (2012, p. 450) warns that OECD best practice is that the board, and not 
the government, should have the power to appoint and dismiss the CEO, along with having 
full responsibility and accountability for the operations of the SOE without political 
interference.  
As seen from Table 1, in Russia, the governance arrangements of SOEs is inadequate 
compared to that of other BRICS countries. Hence, the SOEs are confronted by many 
governance problems, including corruption. This is signalled by Azahaf and Schraad-
Tischler (2012, p. 4) stating:  
Russia shows worrying steering capability shortcomings. Given the 
prevalence of political patronage and clientelism, the lack of involvement of 
independent experts and other stakeholders, and frequent contradictions in 
the communication of policies, forward-looking policy-making in the sense 
of sustainable government is practically impossible in today’s Russia.  
There is a need therefore to develop legal instruments directly related to the SOE regime, 
if Russia is to succeed in strengthening the governance of the SOEs against potential 
governance abuse and corruption. 
Indian and Chinese SOEs have commissions, namely, the Central Vigilance Commission 
(CVC) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which both enhance 
accountabilities. This is a commendable and useful way of enhancing the governance and 
optimal functionality of the SOEs. 
Oftentimes, SOEs, as in China and South Africa, are muddled in party-politics. Therefore, it 
is critical to draw a clear line between a political party and the SOE boards to allow these 
enterprises to thrive without being politically charged or mired in party-politics. Hence, 
there is a need for an umbrella or overarching legislation for SOEs, which clearly defines 
the governance and developmental mandate of SOEs in society to avoid conflicting roles 
and mandates. 
In a nutshell, Table 1 presents some of the loopholes in the legal and institutional 
mechanisms of the respective countries. They show that both Brazil and Russia have legal 
and institutional loopholes that account for why they are predisposed to potential 
governance abuse and corruption. However, the remaining BRICS countries, India, China 
and South Africa, are no exception and all suffer from governance challenges in some way, 
hence, the next section discusses each BRICS country explicitly. Thomas (2012, p. 451) 
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evidence that SOE governance has improved over time. Azahaf and Schraad-Tischler (2012, 
p.30) argue that “overcoming these problems instead demands effective governance and 
future-oriented policy-making in each of the BRICS countries”. 
 
Overview of SOEs state of governance in BRICS countries 
 
Arguably, SOEs in BRICS are exposed to many governance challenges, such as principal-
agent issues, lack of proper oversight and accountability, political interference, weak and 
disorganised boards, and conflicting mandates and interests as a result of a confusing mix 
of the commercial, political and social objectives that SOEs must achieve. These 
governance challenges are not only limited to SOEs in BRICS, but the entire landscape of 
the SOE sector in many economies. Hence, efforts to improve corporate governance in 
SOEs have lagged those of the private sector (Som, 2013). Following these range of 
governance challenges, an overview of the state of SOE governance in each of the BRICS 
countries is outlined below.  
Brazil 
Fontes-Filho and Alves (2018) are of the view that the direction and objectives of SOEs in 
Brazil are subject to regular changes imposed by the country’s political system. These 
changes expose the management of these entities to instability and temporary public 
demands. According to Limoeiro and Schneider (2017), all positions of power and policy 
influence in Brazilian SOEs are subject to the direct appointment and removal by the 
president of that country, contrary to the position in South Africa where the shareholder 
minister of the specific sector, the cabinet, and the board oversee SOEs, while the 
president is hardly involved.  
Limoeiro and Schneider (2017) refer to corruption in the form of kickbacks that occur in 
construction and procurement contracts within Brazilian SOEs (Kyunga et al., 2018). By law, 
Brazilian SOEs should have audit committees as a governance structure; these committees 
are meant to supervise management activities and verify compliance with laws and 
regulations, and provide suggestions on the annual reports of SOEs (Fontes-Filho & Alves, 
2018).  
A new law (Law 13303/2016) has been passed in Brazil, which provides the legal statute 
and rules for the appointment of directors in SOEs, including the appointment of 
independent directors. Fontes-Filho and Alves (2018) further state that the passing of this 
new law points to the continuing fragile structuring of the control mechanisms of 
corporate governance in Brazil. According to Fontes-Filho and Alves (2018, p. 7), the lack 
of independence of the boards of SOEs,  
lack of minimum professional experience for board members, the 
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for releasing the Annual Governance Statement showing the objectives 
regarding public policy and operational and financial data, and the 
compulsory implementation of compliance and risk departments, as well as a 
statutory audit committee, indicate the weaknesses present in the state 
system. 
Russia 
Augustynowicz (2014) is of the view that, in both the English and Russian literature, there 
are very few noteworthy publications that analyse the SOE sector in Russia, as well as the 
corporate governance issues of the state. The above author further contends that “there 
is no unified definition of SOEs in Russia, neither in official documents, nor in the scientific 
literature” (Augustynowicz, 2014, p. 136), because there are SOEs that are wholly state-
owned. In Russia, SOEs have economic value, and are said to employ approximately 35.7% 
of the economically active population (Augustynowicz, 2014). 
The OECD (2004) states that the government of Russia has worked on increasing state 
control in the boards of its SOEs. Regulations were adopted whereby SOEs were classified 
according to their importance to the state and by the level of ministries involved in their 
decision-making. Positive changes have been noted in the legal framework that forms the 
foundation for corporate governance, some of which include the introduction of board-
level committees at most SOEs, such as audit committees that are expected to help 
improve internal controls.  
In addition, the adoption of the Code of Corporate Conduct that was approved for the 
purposes of making recommendations on the regulation of board activities, resulted in 
positive changes in the corporate governance practices in SOEs. Furthermore, the Russian 
Institute of Directors noted improvements in various aspects of corporate governance 
practices, such as higher numbers of independent directors in boards, and disclosures 
(OECD, 2004). 
There are, however, challenges that have been identified in the governance of Russian 
SOEs, such as conflicts of interests and corruption involving SOE board members, lack of 
appropriate requirements for board members, lack of procedures for the evaluation of 
their performance, and a lack of clear objectives for the SOEs. In 2004, the Audit Chamber 
reported the following reasons for the unsatisfactory quality of state property 
management: the Federal Service for Financial Markets did not properly control SOE 
disclosures as expected by the Audit Chamber; and SOEs did not comply with the Code of 
Corporate Conduct with regard to voting on dividends (OECD, 2004). Furthermore, 
government representatives were found to have failed to follow instructions and did not 
comply with the established procedures when making decisions on dividends due on 
government stock. Also, Thomas (2012, p. 452) contends that the process of appointing 
government representatives to boards in Russia lacks transparency, and board members 
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India 
State-owned enterprises in India are referred to as Public Sector Undertakings 
(Subramanian, 2015) or simply Public Enterprises (PE) (Khwandwalla, 1984). Scrimgeour 
and Duppati (2014) report that SOEs are the backbone of the Indian economy, and 
represent around 25% of the country’s GDP (Chakrabarti, 2017). Indian PEs are governed 
by a complex legal and institutional framework, such as the Companies Act, 2013, clause 
49 of the Listing Agreement, and Department of Public Enterprises’ guidelines (Som, 2013).  
Contrary to Russia, India made concerted efforts to devolve the state ownership of some 
corporations to the private sector in 1991. The Indian government introduced new 
economic reforms and industrial policies, which unlocked the sectors that were previously 
the monopoly of the PEs, thus creating a competitive environment. The government 
arguably uses disinvestment as the only available alternative to get rid of unproductive 
state enterprises, owing to either the strategic nature of some industrial sectors, or due to 
the multiplicity of objectives that are not necessarily value adding. Nonetheless, the 
government has retained a vast majority of enterprises under its direct control. Most of 
such enterprises are controlled by parent ministries and managed by career bureaucrats 
(Bhasa, 2015; Subramanian, 2015).  
In addition, corporate governance reforms were introduced to ensure comparable 
performance between PEs and their private counterparts (Scrimgeour & Duppati, 2014). 
Som (2013) contends that the government of India that owns or controls interests in key 
sectors such as infrastructure, oil, gas, mining, and manufacturing, has implemented 
measures—including better corporate governance—to improve the performance of its 
PEs. The above author further states that the reforms have focused on, among others, 
disinvestment of government shares and development of a performance monitoring 
system to ensure the accountability and strengthening of the boards of SOEs. Guidelines 
on Corporate Governance of SOEs were issued in 2007, and became mandatory to be 
implemented from 2010. Similarly, Chakrabarti (2017) states that some emerging 
economies, such as India, have adopted a policy of gradual disinvestment in SOEs, as 
advocated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  
Indian SOEs account to various institutions such as parliament, the Comptroller and 
Auditor General and the CVC (mandated to prevent corruption and malpractice in SOEs), 
and the Public Enterprises Selection Board (PESB) (responsible for managing the process 
of selecting board members, including tenders and advertising) (Scrimgeour & Duppati, 
2014). Scrimgeour and Duppati (2014) argue that the poor performance of SOEs in India is 
caused by the multiple principals that SOEs are accountable to, and who have multiple 
goals and conflicting interests. Khwandwalla (1984) adds and attests that senior 
bureaucrats of the ministry to which the PE is attached, and political masters and officials 
of such other regulatory bodies as the planning commission, the bureau of public 
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managers complain of multiple masters or principals which add to the complexity of the 
SOEs’ governance.  
China 
Wang (2014, p. 637) identified the “twin governance structures” in China’s SOEs: one for 
legal governance and the other for political governance. The legal governance structure, 
featuring the shareholders, the board of directors, the supervisory board, and the 
management team, is installed according to the People’s Republic of China Company Law, 
and represents the convergence of Chinese corporate governance with Western corporate 
law norms. Political governance in China, especially from the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), is a dominated process that controls decision-making and the appointment of 
employees in SOEs (Wang & Han, 2020).  
It has become clear that the role of the party in the SOEs has been strengthened and 
institutionalised in the new round of SOE reforms. Thus, it is apparent that the party-state 
has established two “supremes” in corporate governance, since both the board of directors 
(BOD) and the CCP are prescribed to be the decision-making bodies in SOEs. In such a case, 
as long as the BOD is not given the real power to run the company independently, and the 
CCP is in charge, the percentage of private ownership is more or less irrelevant in SOEs 
with mixed ownership (Wang & Han, 2020).  
China has experienced dramatic economic changes over the last three decades. Although 
China endeavours to transition to a market economy by corporatising its SOEs, it continues 
to exercise a significant degree of influence over the economy, and controls the majority 
of shares in the corporatised SOEs, even after public listing. Chinese institutional or rather, 
governance reforms have produced diversified state ownership regimes. The various types 
of government ownership, therefore, exert different influences on the ownership structure 
and shareholding controls (Tenga, Fuller, & Li, 2018). 
Wang (2014) contends that the number of SOEs in China dropped from 65 000 to 20 000 
between 1998 and 2010. The share of SOEs in the total industry in China has also gone 
from 40% to less than 5%. However, there have been growth in SOEs in capital-intensive, 
upstream sectors, or strategic sectors, such as banking, telecom, energy, and natural 
resources. Xiao (1998) avers that China did not have uniform legislation for all types of 
enterprises with different ownership structures until 1993. Tan and Wang (2007) raise 
various laws and regulations that have been promulgated in China to ensure that there is 
good corporate governance in listed companies, including listed SOEs (Wei, 2003). Some 
of these laws are the Company Law, 1994; the Securities Law, 1999; and regulations issued 
by the CSRC.  
The CSRC has also approved a code of corporate governance for listed companies to 
evaluate whether these companies have good corporate governance structures. However, 
despite the plethora of good laws and regulations aimed at improving good corporate 
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difficulty in establishing a sound corporate governance environment is caused by various 
factors, such as principal-agent problems, conflicting objectives of the state as a 
shareholder and a regulator, as well as a lack of a corporate culture that demands a sense 
of responsibility and accountability from directors, managers, and shareholders (Tan & 
Wang, 2007). Silvestre et al. (2018) claim that governance reforms in some Chinese SOEs 
were unsuccessful because of a lack of state autonomy and capacity.  
Tan and Wang (2007) are of the view that the ‘Anglo-American’ corporate model is absent 
in China. As an example, Tan and Wang (2007) argue that the appointment of directors of 
SOEs is an important aspect of corporate governance. However, listed SOEs do not disclose 
their internal procedures (if any) for nominating directors. Tan and Wang (2007) further 
state that there is political interference in the management of Chinese SOEs, where 
politicians use the firms to achieve political and social objectives, such as preventing loss-
making listed SOEs from bankruptcy for fear that this would aggravate unemployment 
problems and disrupt social stability, instead of maximising the efficiency and performance 
of the firms. This relates to soft budget constraints, which increases the dependency of 
SOEs on the government.  
Wang (2014) differentiates between legal governance and political governance, which, 
according to the author, coexist in the control and operation of Chinese SOEs. The former 
relates to governance within the bounds of state laws, whereas the latter refers to 
personnel appointments and decision-making processes in SOEs, which are dominated by 
the CCP. In many cases, the informal, non-legal rules related to political governance, and 
which run in the background, succeed over the legal rules (Wang, 2014).  
South Africa 
Corrigan (2014) states that the South African government has over a long period 
demonstrated its commitment toward using SOEs as agents of development (Tsheola, 
Ledwaba, & Nembambula, 2013). Further, in theory, the country’s SOEs operate under 
corporate governance best practice, commercial legislation, and public sector financial 
legislation. However, this is not always the case, as over 700 South African SOEs have failed 
repeatedly (Corrigan, 2014).  
Despite SOEs in South Africa being the main drivers of the formal sector of the economy, 
and being responsible for delivering most social goods and services, such as electricity, to 
ensure quality of life to all citizens, the plethora of legislative and regulatory frameworks 
that SOEs operate under remains fragmented (Kanyane & Sausi, 2015). As a result, SOEs 
cannot effectively contribute to the socio-economic development mandate of the state. 
For example, incongruences have been found between the Public Finance Management 
Act, 1999 (29 of 1999) and the Companies Act, 2008 (Act 71 of 2008), which all South 
African SOEs are subject to. A single overarching legislation for SOEs aimed at addressing 
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Responding to a question by a Member of Parliament of the Democratic Alliance, the 
opposition party in South Africa, on what the total cumulative amount of money is that 
was spent on the bailout of SOEs since 27 April 1994, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Tito 
Mboweni, responded as follows: “The total cumulative amount of money spent on SOE 
recapitalisations and bailouts from 2000/01 to 2019/20 is R187.4 billion”, and the amount 
excludes indemnities, guarantees, and other contingent support provided to SOEs 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2020). The minister went on to indicate that 
information from 27 April 1994 was not available.  
The minister’s answer is an example of soft budget constraints, as previously discussed in 
the section on China. Kanyane and Sausi (2015) are of the view that the assessment of SOEs 
in South Africa reveals that these entities are, among others, vulnerable to debt burdens, 
corporate governance dilemmas, and corruption issues, including the state capture 
investigated by the Zondo Commission of Inquiry.  
State-owned enterprises that are constantly bailed out by the government become 
dependent on it, and that may result in them becoming inefficient. ESKOM and South 
African Airways serve as perfect examples of governance failure; they are always 
candidates for state bailouts, thus suffering from state dependency syndrome. The South 
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 
(PRASA), are more examples of SOEs wrought with governance failures that have made 




The above discussions raised critical issues related to the state of governance of SOEs in 
BRICS countries. Given the disparities in how SOEs are run in BRICS countries, their 
respective governances are somewhat incomparable. However, all SOEs have a 
developmental mandate that should be informed by proper governance architecture, and 
a framework emerged from the underlying discussion. Given that SOEs are confronted by 
governance failures, corruption, and socio-economic vulnerabilities in their respective 
BRICS countries, they often find it difficult to function optimally as the principal drivers of 
the formal sector of the economy.  
The current SOE governance in BRICS countries is inadequate, especially in Brazil and 
Russia, necessitating the need to have overarching legal and institutional mechanisms that 
clearly define how SOEs should function effectively and efficiently. It is evident that SOEs 
should be underpinned by a governance framework that is all-encompassing, legal, 
institutional, financially accountable, transparent, independent of party-politics and 
interference. In addition, SOEs should operate in a flexible environment that allows them 
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To this end, at both the regional and international front, SOEs in BRICS, as the principal 
drivers of the sector in emerging economies, should not be stifled but should be given 
chance to flourish in the regional and international markets. Through the SOEs, BRICS, as 
an emerging global force, could remain resilient against trade wars, COVID-19 challenges, 
and various economic failures in the world, especially if their governance arrangements 
are depoliticised. BRICS, for example, should engage in bilateral talks to create a flexible 
governance and enabling environment within the remit of BRICS summitry protocols and 
diplomacies to allow BRICS countries to thrive as emerging economies. Finally, if BRICS 
aims to lead the emerging economies successfully as a global force, each BRICS country 
must resolve their own SOEs’ governance challenges to ensure that SOEs function 
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